In a strange turn of events, the upcoming election in Israel might turn out to be more relevant to US interests abroad than those held recently for our new President.  It is growing increasingly clear that Likud will have a sizable victory in the upcoming elections, which seems to stem from a growing frustration with Kadima on the issue of Israeli security.  There is no question that the issue of national security is paramount in these elections, which allows us a great opportunity to analyze the platform of the likely winner, and how that might affect the prospect of peace in the middle east.

Special Elections

Calls for Olmert to step down began in 2007, after elements of the scathing Winograd Commission report were leaked, asserting mismanagement of the Lebanese conflict.  Olmert managed to deflect the calls for his resignation until the middle of 2008, when cries of corruption became deafening and internal Kadima opinions regarding his suitability began to match the increasing public demand for his resignation, which peaked as high as 80%.

In July of 2008, Olmert announced that he would resign once a new Kadima leader was found.  Livni, a harsh critic of Olmert won the Kadima election, and was given six weeks to form a coalition government.  When Livni failed to capture the support of many of the minority parties, elections were scheduled for February of 2009.  Olmert has presided over the provisional government for the last five months, since October of 2008.

The Tenor of the Campaigns

Since Sharon’s departure from Likud to start Kadima, many pundits placed the future and legitimacy of the Kadima party strictly on his shoulders.  However, Kadima won handedly in 2006, despite Sharon’s stroke, largely on the platform of Palestinian negotiations, and Sharon’s highly controversial disengagement strategy.  Kadima relied heavily on the US backed Annapolis talks, which much of the Israeli public has seen as a failure in light of seeming perpetual rocket fire from Gaza into northwestern Negev.

It goes without saying that the issue of national security is dominating the upcoming elections, and has set the cadence and tenor of each party’s campaign.  A Likud win is increasingly likely, no doubt bolstered by Israeli public support for more aggressive stance on security.  In fact, certain polls show almost ubiquitous support (94%) by the Israeli public for the Gazan offensive.  Kadima’s opposition, not just Likud, is critical of Kadima for the IDF’s early withdrawal from Gaza before the stated objectives had been met.

The Likud Theme

The Likud Constitution from the 15th Knesset is the one that is most often cited, and referenced.  Although Likud’s policies have softened in many ways rhetorically, including certain statements regarding the possibility of a Palestinian state, the change in tone has been mostly semantic.  Likud has had multiple opportunities to revise their stance, including the adoption of a more moderate “defensible borders” plan in 2006, but the policies have remained largely the same.

The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river.

The Palestinians can run their lives freely in the framework of self-rule, but not as an independent and sovereign state. Thus, for example, in matters of foreign affairs, security, immigration and ecology, their activity shall be limited in accordance with imperatives of Israel’s existence, security and national needs.

Although the Likud parted ways from this stance under the leadership of the likes of Sharon, these countervailing paradigms eventually splintered Likud, and caused Sharon to leave and start Kadima.  This allowed Likud to snap back, and realign with their ‘99 platform under the leadership of Netanyahu, who had long been critical of the concessions made in Oslo, the unilateral disengagement by Sharon, and of any concessions regarding Jerusalem.  However, both Sharon and Netanyahu supported the erection of a dividing wall, and also considered Oslo dead.

In the platform for the upcoming elections, Likud’s stance is a bit more of opaque.  Leading up to the elections, Netanyahu refused to sign an oath against the possibility of a Palestinian State, but has been staunchly against it’s creation in the current climate.

“Any Palestinian state that would be formed under the current conditions would become an Iranian state as we saw happen in Gaza,” Netanyahu said. “[But] we all must work to advance peace while considering reality.”

Critics, however, say that this is only a rhetorical move that prevents a Likud platform that would potentially conflict or frustrate relations with the nascent Obama administration.

Netanyahu’s associates said he did not want to govern a single Palestinian, but under certain circumstances, he would agree to a state with limited sovereignty and powers.

Many of the discussions regarding the peace process are centered around the West Bank regions, but the future of Gaza is never explicitly referenced.  Fatah’s recognition by world forces has, up to this point, rested on the notion that they were the representative body of a unified Palestine, however, the de facto administrative split of Gaza and West Bank confound this relationship.  With Fatah’s popularity and bargaining power on the decline, and a perpetual civil war between Hamas and Fatah, the feasibility of a two state solution is called into question.  In many ways, Hamas’ bloody coup did more damage to the possibility of peace than anything that has happened within the last ten years.

Likud and Palestine

Likud’s attitude towards Palestine can be gleaned more from the rhetoric of their campaign than from their platform.  Most recently, Netanyahu has accused Kadima of desiring sweeping concessions, and desiring a return to the 1967 borders.  In light of this, they would certainly be a large change in policy for Likud to make regional concessions during peace negotiations.

Hamas senior leadership, including Meshal, Haniyeh and Zahar, since winning the election in 2006, have rejected the terms set forth by the Madrid Quartet – recognition of Israel, abandonment of violence, and respect for preexisting diplomatic agreements.  However, there seems to be evidence that pragmatists might be gaining a voice within the party.

Three Hamas leaders interviewed by AP said they would accept statehood in just the West Bank and Gaza and would give up their “resistance” against Israel if that were achieved.

“We accept a state in the ‘67 borders,” said Hamad. “We are not talking about the destruction of Israel.”

Haniyeh has been quoted as having the same sentiments, but ‘67 borders were never a matter of discussion. Whether this signifies a change in policies of Hamas has yet to be seen.  But, until senior leadership concurs with this notion, and makes strides towards the Quartet’s terms, and Likud, if successful in the election, changes its stance regarding certain concessions, there will be no peaceful resolution in the near future.  There has been evidence that much of the more moderate Hamas politicians have been silenced, and the hardline rhetoric promulgated forth.

Likud and Settlements

One of the most controversial elements of the Likud platform is their stance on settlements.  Although traditionally, Likud has been supportive of new settlements, Netanyahu has recently expressed support for only the expansion of preexisting settlements as necessary for “natural growth”, not for new settlements.

“I have no intention of building new settlements in the West Bank,” Netanyahu told Mr Blair in quotes carried by Haaretz newspaper.

“But like all the governments there have been until now, I will have to meet the needs of natural growth in the population. I will not be able to choke the settlements.”

Netanyahu has been extremely critical of Livni on the subject of settlements, even accusing Kadima of giving up Jerusalem.  This has been a standing theme of Likud’s election rhetoric.

Whether Netanyahu will remove some of the settlements in the West Bank remains to be seen.  He has only expressly rejected the notion of unilateral removal of settlements, but has not outright rejected the possibility of settlement removal as part of a compromise.

Likud Security Plan

Netanyahu’s security plan for Israel has been expressed as “economic peace”, although this plan references Gaza in little regard.

Israel should be focusing its efforts instead on helping Abu Mazen and Fayad improve the day-to-day lives of Palestinians. In particular, we should be trying to help them rapidly develop their economy. While this will not resolve the conflict, it can create an environment in which negotiations would have a better chance of succeeding. A Likud-led government will immediately focus on a serious and sustained effort to fundamentally change the situation on the ground.

Specifically, this references the use of Palestinian labor for settlement maintenance and building, as well as Palestinian employment in Israeli factories and businesses in the West Bank.  The plan is based on the notion that much of the Palestinian dissidence is resulting from their socio-economic status, and that a bolstered economy would lower the temperature of the issues involved.  This plan has come under heavy fire by the opposition, citing the improbability of industry to flourish in the West Bank given the current political climate.

But to export, one needs access to markets. No entrepreneur will build a plant unless he knows for certain that his merchandise will reach clients, and that his raw materials and workers will reach the plant, on time.

The restrictions of movement in the territories, and with Israel and the rest of the world, mean that this is not the case. No wonder, then, that Palestinian exports are barely what they were 20 years ago.

Likud and Iran

Likud has always taken a characteristically hostile stand on Iran, however, if placement on their platform is any indication, it will play a large theme in the months ahead.  There has been speculation regarding the possibility of an Israeli attack against Iran.  Likud considers Iran to be an existential threat to Israel, and handles it as such.

Twelve years later, Iran is closer than ever to achieving nuclear capability, a situation that would at once pose an existential threat to the State of Israel and radically change the balance of power in our region, thus endangering the entire world.

With Iran’s new found interest in the region, Egypt’s future in question, Arab reluctance for a power play in its own backyard, and increasing popular discontent with Arab leadership, the existing infrastructure might soon find itself at a precarious precipice.  Israel, US, EU largely consider their security apparatus as reliant on Egyptian and Arab support, but a further decline of the situation in the middle east might catalyze a change in policy.

Going Forward

It remains to be seen what the outcome will be for the special elections.  Even if Likud wins, the margin will most likely not be large enough to hold power without a coalition with other parties.  In Israeli elections, votes are tallied for parties, not specific individuals.  The party that receives the most parliamentary votes gets the nod to create their own government.

Livni, for the first time in Israeli history, failed to create a government coalition, which led to the special election.  Even if Netanyahu wins, he will most likely find himself with around 30 seats, which means a coalition with more moderate parties might be in store.  If the recent polls are any indication, regardless of who wins, the Israeli public seems to be demanding more agreessive action by their government.  How this plays out remains to be seen, but one thing is for certain – the next twenty four months will have plenty of news from the middle east coming over the wires.

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