Special Elections

Calls for Olmert to step down began in 2007, after elements of the scathing Winograd Commission report were leaked, asserting mismanagement of the Lebanese conflict.  Olmert managed to deflect the calls for his resignation until the middle of 2008, when cries of corruption became deafening and internal Kadima opinions regarding his suitability began to match the increasing public demand for his resignation, which peaked as high as 80%.

In July of 2008, Olmert announced that he would resign once a new Kadima leader was found.  Livni, a harsh critic of Olmert won the Kadima election, and was given six weeks to form a coalition government.  When Livni failed to capture the support of many of the minority parties, elections were scheduled for February of 2009.  Olmert has presided over the provisional government for the last five months, since October of 2008.

The Tenor of the Campaigns

Since Sharon’s departure from Likud to start Kadima, many pundits placed the future and legitimacy of the Kadima party strictly on his shoulders.  However, Kadima won handedly in 2006, despite Sharon’s stroke, largely on the platform of Palestinian negotiations, and Sharon’s highly controversial disengagement strategy.  Kadima relied heavily on the US backed Annapolis talks, which much of the Israeli public has seen as a failure in light of seeming perpetual rocket fire from Gaza into northwestern Negev.

It goes without saying that the issue of national security is dominating the upcoming elections, and has set the cadence and tenor of each party’s campaign.  A Likud win is increasingly likely, no doubt bolstered by Israeli public support for more aggressive stance on security.  In fact, certain polls show almost ubiquitous support (94%) by the Israeli public for the Gazan offensive.  Kadima’s opposition, not just Likud, is critical of Kadima for the IDF’s early withdrawal from Gaza before the stated objectives had been met.

The Likud Theme

The Likud Constitution from the 15th Knesset is the one that is most often cited, and referenced.  Although Likud’s policies have softened in many ways rhetorically, including certain statements regarding the possibility of a Palestinian state, the change in tone has been mostly semantic.  Likud has had multiple opportunities to revise their stance, including the adoption of a more moderate “defensible borders” plan in 2006, but the policies have remained largely the same.

The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river.

The Palestinians can run their lives freely in the framework of self-rule, but not as an independent and sovereign state. Thus, for example, in matters of foreign affairs, security, immigration and ecology, their activity shall be limited in accordance with imperatives of Israel’s existence, security and national needs.

Although the Likud parted ways from this stance under the leadership of the likes of Sharon, these countervailing paradigms eventually splintered Likud, and caused Sharon to leave and start Kadima.  This allowed Likud to snap back, and realign with their ‘99 platform under the leadership of Netanyahu, who had long been critical of the concessions made in Oslo, the unilateral disengagement by Sharon, and of any concessions regarding Jerusalem.  However, both Sharon and Netanyahu supported the erection of a dividing wall, and also considered Oslo dead.

In the platform for the upcoming elections, Likud’s stance is a bit more of opaque.  Leading up to the elections, Netanyahu refused to sign an oath against the possibility of a Palestinian State, but has been staunchly against it’s creation in the current climate.

“Any Palestinian state that would be formed under the current conditions would become an Iranian state as we saw happen in Gaza,” Netanyahu said. “[But] we all must work to advance peace while considering reality.”

Critics, however, say that this is only a rhetorical move that prevents a Likud platform that would potentially conflict or frustrate relations with the nascent Obama administration.

Netanyahu’s associates said he did not want to govern a single Palestinian, but under certain circumstances, he would agree to a state with limited sovereignty and powers.

Many of the discussions regarding the peace process are centered around the West Bank regions, but the future of Gaza is never explicitly referenced.  Fatah’s recognition by world forces has, up to this point, rested on the notion that they were the representative body of a unified Palestine, however, the de facto administrative split of Gaza and West Bank confound this relationship.  With Fatah’s popularity and bargaining power on the decline, and a perpetual civil war between Hamas and Fatah, the feasibility of a two state solution is called into question.  In many ways, Hamas’ bloody coup did more damage to the possibility of peace than anything that has happened within the last ten years.

Likud and Palestine

Likud’s attitude towards Palestine can be gleaned more from the rhetoric of their campaign than from their platform.  Most recently, Netanyahu has accused Kadima of desiring sweeping concessions, and desiring a return to the 1967 borders.  In light of this, they would certainly be a large change in policy for Likud to make regional concessions during peace negotiations.

Hamas senior leadership, including Meshal, Haniyeh and Zahar, since winning the election in 2006, have rejected the terms set forth by the Madrid Quartet – recognition of Israel, abandonment of violence, and respect for preexisting diplomatic agreements.  However, there seems to be evidence that pragmatists might be gaining a voice within the party.

Three Hamas leaders interviewed by AP said they would accept statehood in just the West Bank and Gaza and would give up their “resistance” against Israel if that were achieved.

“We accept a state in the ‘67 borders,” said Hamad. “We are not talking about the destruction of Israel.”

Haniyeh has been quoted as having the same sentiments, but ‘67 borders were never a matter of discussion. Whether this signifies a change in policies of Hamas has yet to be seen.  But, until senior leadership concurs with this notion, and makes strides towards the Quartet’s terms, and Likud, if successful in the election, changes its stance regarding certain concessions, there will be no peaceful resolution in the near future.  There has been evidence that much of the more moderate Hamas politicians have been silenced, and the hardline rhetoric promulgated forth.

Likud and Settlements

One of the most controversial elements of the Likud platform is their stance on settlements.  Although traditionally, Likud has been supportive of new settlements, Netanyahu has recently expressed support for only the expansion of preexisting settlements as necessary for “natural growth”, not for new settlements.

“I have no intention of building new settlements in the West Bank,” Netanyahu told Mr Blair in quotes carried by Haaretz newspaper.

“But like all the governments there have been until now, I will have to meet the needs of natural growth in the population. I will not be able to choke the settlements.”

Netanyahu has been extremely critical of Livni on the subject of settlements, even accusing Kadima of giving up Jerusalem.  This has been a standing theme of Likud’s election rhetoric.

Whether Netanyahu will remove some of the settlements in the West Bank remains to be seen.  He has only expressly rejected the notion of unilateral removal of settlements, but has not outright rejected the possibility of settlement removal as part of a compromise.

Likud Security Plan

Netanyahu’s security plan for Israel has been expressed as “economic peace”, although this plan references Gaza in little regard.

Israel should be focusing its efforts instead on helping Abu Mazen and Fayad improve the day-to-day lives of Palestinians. In particular, we should be trying to help them rapidly develop their economy. While this will not resolve the conflict, it can create an environment in which negotiations would have a better chance of succeeding. A Likud-led government will immediately focus on a serious and sustained effort to fundamentally change the situation on the ground.

Specifically, this references the use of Palestinian labor for settlement maintenance and building, as well as Palestinian employment in Israeli factories and businesses in the West Bank.  The plan is based on the notion that much of the Palestinian dissidence is resulting from their socio-economic status, and that a bolstered economy would lower the temperature of the issues involved.  This plan has come under heavy fire by the opposition, citing the improbability of industry to flourish in the West Bank given the current political climate.

But to export, one needs access to markets. No entrepreneur will build a plant unless he knows for certain that his merchandise will reach clients, and that his raw materials and workers will reach the plant, on time.

The restrictions of movement in the territories, and with Israel and the rest of the world, mean that this is not the case. No wonder, then, that Palestinian exports are barely what they were 20 years ago.

Likud and Iran

Likud has always taken a characteristically hostile stand on Iran, however, if placement on their platform is any indication, it will play a large theme in the months ahead.  There has been speculation regarding the possibility of an Israeli attack against Iran.  Likud considers Iran to be an existential threat to Israel, and handles it as such.

Twelve years later, Iran is closer than ever to achieving nuclear capability, a situation that would at once pose an existential threat to the State of Israel and radically change the balance of power in our region, thus endangering the entire world.

With Iran’s new found interest in the region, Egypt’s future in question, Arab reluctance for a power play in its own backyard, and increasing popular discontent with Arab leadership, the existing infrastructure might soon find itself at a precarious precipice.  Israel, US, EU largely consider their security apparatus as reliant on Egyptian and Arab support, but a further decline of the situation in the middle east might catalyze a change in policy.

Going Forward

It remains to be seen what the outcome will be for the special elections.  Even if Likud wins, the margin will most likely not be large enough to hold power without a coalition with other parties.  In Israeli elections, votes are tallied for parties, not specific individuals.  The party that receives the most parliamentary votes gets the nod to create their own government.

Livni, for the first time in Israeli history, failed to create a government coalition, which led to the special election.  Even if Netanyahu wins, he will most likely find himself with around 30 seats, which means a coalition with more moderate parties might be in store.  If the recent polls are any indication, regardless of who wins, the Israeli public seems to be demanding more agreessive action by their government.  How this plays out remains to be seen, but one thing is for certain – the next twenty four months will have plenty of news from the middle east coming over the wires.

Hamas Charter

The charter that is most often referenced is that of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).  A political group started in the eighties with the overarching intent of liberating Palestine.  Relevant portions of the Hamas charter are as follows:

Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it

Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement.

There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors.

The intents, and methods of Hamas are clear.  However, it would be irresponsible not to at least point out that the calls for the destruction of Israel were removed from the Hamas election platform.  In fact, the Hamas election platform supports a Palestine, and thus two state solution, with respect to the 1967 borders, which are often used as a standard during peace negotiations.  The platform only calls directly for the elimination of the occupation, and not the destruction of the Israeli state.

Fatah Charter

Because of Fatah’s recent interest in working with Israel, US and EU towards a resolution, their charter has often gone unacknowledged, and is considered moderate when compared to Hamas.  However, if we are to give credence to Hamas’ charter, especially in light of the changes they made to their election platform, it would only be fair to consider the Fatah charter as well.

Article (12) Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence.

This might seem fairly innocuous at first, and could be interpreted to mean the eradication of Zionist influence within Palestine, however, the true meaning is elucidated further down.

Article (19) Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People’s armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated.

In fact, the charter further references the desire for Jerusalem to be the capital city, which is of disputed territory as well.

If taken at face value, although the language is not as strong regarding the methods by which to procure the Palestinian state – the intentions of Fatah could not be clearer.

Likud Platform

One charter that rarely is referenced is the platform of Likud.  This charter is important, if not more important than the charters of Hamas and Fatah, because the peace process is often defined by the demands of Israel.

The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river.

The Palestinians can run their lives freely in the framework of self-rule, but not as an independent and sovereign state. Thus, for example, in matters of foreign affairs, security, immigration and ecology, their activity shall be limited in accordance with imperatives of Israel’s existence, security and national needs.

Based on the Likud charter, Israel refuses to recognize an autonamous and sovereign Palestinian state, but more so, refuses to recognize an established Palestinian state west of the Jordan river, which would make Gaza a particular region of interest during negotiations.

It is important when analyzing the different interests involved, that each group is researched with equanimity.  Fair and equitable analysis is vital to a resolution in the current Mid-East crisis.

Modern liberal intellectual culture is against us, against the Cross, against the God of Love. People don’t think like they used to. Values are crumbling. Tolerance has turned to license. And we must fight; we must defend our Faith. We must fight against the culture. The Church is in trouble, because culture has changed.

Basilique de Notre-Dame de Montreal -- joelmann

This line of thinking has some merit, but those should not be exaggerated. And it should be acknowledged in full sobriety that this message is usually taught to the untaught by the untaught, it is shared and lived (and indeed, sometimes lived well) among people generally not much concerned with or well versed in history (either of the Church or the culture). Their assessment is a topical assessment: it addresses, correctly, the symptom, but it does not fathom the cause. In America, we like to treat symptoms; that has become our way. Sally is sad; give her a pill. Betty is fat; give her surgery. Taxpayers are unhappy; stimulate them. Companies are failing; give them money. Kids lack the education to pass standardized tests; teach special classes on tests—but don’t worry about giving them an education in the process.  This has become our way. And it is the wrong way. And in cafes and pulpits all over the country, faithful (and unfaithful) Christians are taught that the church is hurting because the culture has changed. I don’t dispute this fact. That the sharp decline in morality, accountability, decency, and reason in America is a grievous problem is not here contested in the least; but it is not the cause of the problem. It is a symptom. If it is true that the Church is in trouble because culture has changed; it is even more true that the culture has changed because the Church is in trouble. That is the real problem.

Most of the problems that churches see in our culture are real problems, and many of those problems have their source in the very churches themselves. The unfolding of those problems has been slow, but it has also been steady. We lament today that our common morality has been thrown out the window; but it was first thrown off a steeple. When Christians, who are supposed to be witnesses to the Light in a world of darkness, begin themselves to dim, one cannot expect too much from the rest of the culture. When we remove marriage from the list of sacraments, we cannot be too surprised at high divorce rates. When our generations does not call Blessed the Mother of God, we cannot be too surprised that women our objectified. When we do not decry the death penalty for what it is (an attempt to play God with human lives), we cannot be too surprised that people would do the same with babies—after all, babies and convicted felons cast the same amount of ballots. When we are not consistent in our reasoning, we cannot be too surprised when politicians equivocate. When we interpret the Scriptures to serve our own ends, we cannot be too surprised that judges interpret the Constitution to serve theirs. When Christians do not submit to the authority of Church, we cannot be too surprised that citizens do not submit to the authority of the law.

A seed of dissent has always been buried in the Church; five hundred years ago that seed grew roots, and cracked the unity of the Church; in those five centuries, that seed has but up shoots (34,000 denominations at my last count); and in the last fifty years, those shoots have borne fruits and flowers—but they are poisonous. When the Church is not united, can we be surprised that our culture is divided?

The outrages in our culture were first permitted by some church somewhere. We compromised first. Society has not abandoned us; we have abandoned society. Christians are fools if they expect society to do anything but crumble without the influence of the Church. We lament that the pro-abortion lobby will not listen to reason; but many among the faithful abandoned reason long ago. We lament that the government does not heed the cry of the poor; but we are parking our fancy cars in gated communities. We expect the culture to answer to expectations that we do not meet. And when Christians lower the bar, can we be surprised that the culture trips?

The war is not against the culture; it is for the culture; and it is within the church. Until the voice of the faithful is truly one voice, preaching one Gospel, we will not speak in harmony, consistency, or with authority. When Christians cannot agree on what is permitted, can we expect the culture to agree on what should be prohibited? If we treat the Christian faith as something that belongs to us, then we are not truly free to give it. If we rule the faith; the faith cannot rule us.  And if we are content to let the faith lead us whichever way we want to go, we cannot be surprised if the forces that lead the culture lead it wherever they want it to go. The culture is beating us at our own game, a game that we have mastered, a game that we invented—but then again, the game is an old one, won and lost in Eden long ago. And so long as we our own masters, we will be slaves of the culture. And like ignorant rebellious slaves we war with our master, we seek to cure the symptoms of our slavery, instead of seeking the causes.

Despite the attempts to bifurcate the analysis to one of Arab-Israeli interests, the reality is far more complex- a deadly game of Chinese Checkers has begun, with four interests at the helm, and the Gazans as pawns.

To understand this convergence of interests, you must recognize the different players involved, and the goals of each.  Over the course of the next few weeks, I hope to identify those interests and bring some background that is so lacking in much of the narrative as told by the press.

Hamas comes to power

In 2006, with the election providing a majority of parliamentary seats to Sunni Hamas, widely regarded as a terrorist organization, the Palestinian Authority found itself in a precarious position.  Much of the headway that had been made by the likes of Arafat began to unravel, and prognostications of war once again filled the airwaves.

Although Hamas was democratically elected, it was due in no small part to Iranian support.  Experts, however, disagree on whether this support was merely financial, or whether it included smuggled munitions as well.  Although Iranian weapons have been found in Palestine, and used against the IDF, the direct source of the weapons hasn’t been established.  This point, however, is largely moot – money for the purpose of armament is de facto identical to direct armament.

The PA favored a two-state solution to the conflict, and Hamas favored the outright destruction of Israel.  In fact, their charter says just that.

“There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors.”

Before the election, references to the destruction of Israel were removed from their “election manifesto”, similar to a political platform, to make the possibility of their rule more palatable.  However, its paradigms were still emblazoned in their charter, and the coming year would elucidate the reality of their intentions beyond question.

Although many have distinguished Hamas from Fatah by citing their destructive intent – it is worth noting that Fatah is not wholly dissimilar.  In fact, one need look no further than the origin of their name for this fact to become abundantly clear.  Fatah’s full name is “Harakat at-taHreer al-waTani al-filasTeenee”, which has a loose acronym of hataf, an Arabic word for violent death.  Reverse that, and you have fatah, an Arabic word that, roughly translated, refers to the nascence of victory.

Hamas and Fatah

As a result of the elections, sanctions were placed on Gaza by a multitude of states, including the US, EU, Israel and Egypt.  Hamas was given a triad of ultimata before the crossings would be opened again; recognize Israel, denounce terrorism, and conformance with Fatah forged agreements.  Hamas declined, choosing instead to funnel money in to sustain itself.  In response, the US eventually began funding and arming anti-Hamas forces.

A military backed police force was constructed in May of 2006, mostly made up of members from Hamas paramilitary group, al-Qassam. Although al-Qassam had originally been a formidable force in the West Bank as well, IDF raids in 2005 had destroyed much of their infrastructure, and they were forced to maintain operations in Gaza, which was considered their home base.  The Hamas-loyal police force soon found itself in conflicts with rival party, Fatah, militias.  The tensions wouldn’t come to head, however, until Abbas called for another Palestinian general election in December of 2006.

Sporadic firefights between the two factions would continue, with ceasefire attempts on both sides never lasting long.  Finally, in June 2007, tensions culminated as civil war took hold of Gaza, and Hamas started a bloody coup. The campaign began with Hamas militants throwing Fatah members off of a 15-story apartment building. Beginning in the north, over the course of four days, Hamas would take over Gaza and establish their own government.

In response, Abbas’ declared a state of emergency, and took over the government of both the West Bank and Gaza.  Israel had already shut down all crossings into Gaza.  Rafah would become a different issue, as the EU, and thus EUBAM had a policy of no contact with Hamas.  To the chagrin of Israel, Egypt worked with Hamas to open the crossing for 2 separate days to allow for civilian passage.  Because of Israeli strategic concerns regarding terrorist training, and Egypt’s own concerns about collusion between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood- the Rafah closing has remained effectively closed to this day.

Although both regions are considered as governed by the PA, it remains two exclusive entities, with only the West Bank under de facto control of the Palestinian Authority.  The EU, US and Israel have since created diplomatic ties to the new PA government, and resumed aid.

Hamas rule has made some changes in governance as well.  Most recently, with a push towards the imposition of Sha’ria law, reports have been made of crucifixion making its return as well.  Although the imposition of more puritanical elements of Islamic governance has drawn praise from Wahhabi groups, these same groups have referred to Hamas as “sell outs”.

Hamas members have since been ousted out of the parliament in the West Bank, and governance is largely mutually exclusive between the two states.  Gaza remains a hotbed, with infighting not only directly between Fatah and Hamas factions, but also groups like Islamic Jihad, and PRC.

Please return for other posts in this ongoing series regarding the war in Gaza.  In the next post, we will look at the 2006 elections further.